Rowe DTPed (2).doc (Do Not Delete)

2/11/2010 2:15 PM

Copyright © 2010 by Washington Law Review Association

ALL RISE!
STANDING IN JUDGE BETTY FLETCHER’S COURT
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.*
Abstract: In this essay, based on a talk given at the Washington Law Review’s March
2009 symposium in honor of Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher and her three
decades of service on that court, I selectively survey her opinions on justiciability issues:
standing, ripeness, mootness, and political questions. A significant starting point for this
survey is Professor Richard Pierce’s 1999 law review article, Is Standing Law or Politics?,
arguing that many Supreme Court votes in standing cases generally, and appellate judges’
votes in environmental-standing cases specifically, can be explained better on the basis of
politics than by reference to supposedly governing doctrine. Based on the findings reported
in Pierce’s article, one might expect to find Ninth Circuit judges splitting along predictable
ideological lines. In this brief survey, I find that some Ninth Circuit panels on which Judge
Fletcher has sat do split along ideological lines, but that most are unanimous in their
justiciability rulings even when the panels are ideologically mixed—and one finds variations,
such as splits among judges appointed by Democratic Presidents and generally regarded as
“liberal.” Another possible tendency would be for judges to find justiciability when they
might be expected to be favorably disposed to the substantive claim on the merits, and to
avoid reaching the merits of what might be unappealing claims. Similarly, in some cases on
which Judge Fletcher has sat, some judges’ votes could be viewed as fitting such patterns,
but counterexamples abound. This essay, which focuses on the work of one judge and does
not systematically compare votes of judges from different parts of the political spectrum,
cannot claim to disprove the political view; but that view finds little if any support in Judge
Fletcher’s cases.

INTRODUCTION
Sometimes you think of a title that may be too cute, or is at least
catchy enough that you have to come up with an article to go with it. My
title, All Rise! Standing in Judge Betty Fletcher’s Court, may be nifty
but could also be somewhat misleading, because I’ve tried to look at all
the cases heard by Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher that
deal with constitutional and prudential justiciability issues.1 Thus, the
*

Elvin R. Latty Professor Emeritus, Duke University School of Law. Full disclosure: Senior Ninth
Circuit Judge Betty B. Fletcher, the honoree of this symposium, is my mother-in-law. My wife,
Susan Fletcher French, is Judge Fletcher’s eldest child and a professor on the faculty of the UCLA
School of Law.
1. My search in the Ninth Circuit database on Westlaw was extremely broad—“Fletcher &
(justiciab! standing moot! ripe! unripe! “political question”)” with a date restriction to exclude years
before she went on the bench. The search produced just over 2,000 hits, most of them minor or
irrelevant, as of January 2, 2010. I clicked on all. It’s fortunate that I don’t seem to be subject to
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coverage here of this significant and interesting area includes not only
standing but also political questions, ripeness, and mootness.2
Nonetheless, the majority of cases deal with standing. I concentrate on
decisions in which she has written for the court or separately, while also
looking at some in which she has just joined others’ opinions. Since
Judge Fletcher has been on the Ninth Circuit for three decades, coverage
is necessarily selective; I have tried to pick out her most important
justiciability cases and to identify patterns about which some
generalization may be possible, and also areas in which it does not
appear that her decisions fit with what might have been a predicted
pattern.
Justiciability is not a field in which one might expect a federal
appellate judge to develop in a major way her own distinctive
jurisprudence. In contrast to some other areas, such as environmental
law,3 the Supreme Court has left few if any broad justiciability questions
of first impression unaddressed. Thus to a considerable extent this essay
looks not at Judge Fletcher’s contributions to the field but rather,
through the work of one experienced and distinguished intermediatecourt judge, at how the Supreme Court’s justiciability doctrines work in
application. I have taught these doctrines on a top-down basis in Federal
Courts class for decades, and so this essay in part reflects a testing of my
own impressions and key points that I have been teaching. It discusses
not so much what Judge Fletcher has done, but rather what one

carpal-tunnel syndrome.
One somewhat amusing result of my Westlaw search is a candidate for inclusion in that wellknown social-science publication—the Journal of Insignificant Findings: Judge Fletcher is fond of
the expression “standing alone,” in the sense that some factor by itself is not enough to compel thusand-such a conclusion. See, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2008) (B.
Fletcher, J.) (“[F]ormation of a contract with a nonresident defendant is not, standing alone,
sufficient to create jurisdiction.”), cert. denied, 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1318 (2009); Pierce v.
County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1209 (9th Cir.) (B. Fletcher, J.) (“[A] detainee’s placement in
administrative segregation does not, standing alone, justify a complete denial of opportunities to
practice religion.”), cert. denied, 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 597 (2008). That phrase caused a large
number of false hits in my database search.
2. Cases on “statutory standing” are excluded from this essay’s coverage because, despite the
label, they really tend to be about whether the plaintiff has stated a claim under the relevant statute.
See, e.g., Vaughn v. Bay Envtl. Mgmt., Inc., 567 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2009) (B. Fletcher, J.)
(“[A] dismissal for lack of statutory standing is properly viewed as a dismissal for failure to state a
claim rather than a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”). Criminal or habeas cases
involving issues of standing to object to allegedly illegal searches, which are usually fairly routine,
and ripeness in takings cases, a specialized area, are also excluded.
3. See Kenneth S. Weiner, The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Jurisprudence of
Ninth Circuit Judge Betty B. Fletcher: A Trustee of the Environment and Woman of Substance, 85
WASH. L. REV. 45 (2010).
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experienced Federal Courts teacher has learned on the subject through
surveying her justiciability cases.
Part I develops as a point of departure the well-argued thesis from a
significant article on standing (which might apply also to other
justiciability doctrines): that case outcomes seem to be more determined
by judges’ apparent political leanings than by articulated doctrines.4 Part
II looks at Judge Fletcher’s record on review and reports finding no
reversals of justiciability opinions she has written, and just one reversal
of a justiciability opinion that she has joined. Part III returns to the
justiciability-as-politics issue, looking for ideological division in panels
on which Judge Fletcher has served. It finds some evidence, but not
much, of such division, with some non-ideological splits as well. Part IV
takes up another aspect of the same issue, hunting for judicial tendencies
to find justiciability in cases involving possibly sympathetic merits
claims and the reverse. Again, some cases that could fit such a pattern do
appear, but there are many counterexamples.
I.

STANDING: LAW OR POLITICS?

While Federal Courts professors teach standard justiciability
doctrines, many of us also acknowledge that the area is often regarded as
a quite politicized and manipulable corner of the law. The Federal
Courts casebook that I co-author5 reproduces extracts from a significant
1999 article by Professor Richard Pierce of the George Washington law
faculty.6 Based on several then-recent Supreme Court cases on standing
generally, plus a significant number of court of appeals standing
decisions in environmental cases, Professor Pierce reluctantly concluded
that doctrine was less useful in predicting votes than a political-science
view based on ideology, apparently as indicated by the party of the
President who had appointed a justice or circuit judge.7 In five Supreme
Court cases, a “political scientist with no knowledge of the law of
standing would have had no difficulty predicting the outcome of each
case and predicting thirty-one of the thirty-three votes cast by Justices
with clear ideological preferences . . . .”8

4. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741 (1999).
5. HOWARD P. FINK ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CASES AND
MATERIALS (3d ed. 2007).
6. Pierce, supra note 4, quoted in FINK ET AL., supra note 5, at 102–04.
7. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 1744 (referring to “Republican judges” and “Democratic judges”).
8. Id. at 1754–55.
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It is not just that liberals generally favored broad standing while
conservatives were for narrower approaches: conservatives favored
standing for banks while liberals usually did not, and the votes were
reversed when it came to standing for prisoners, employees, and
environmentalists.9 I had sometimes thought, and suggested to my
students, that voting patterns would be considerably less ideological in
lower courts, which are supposed to be applying the Supreme Court’s
teachings. But Pierce reports that in thirty-three appellate environmentalstanding cases in the middle 1990s, Republican appointees voted against
standing 43.5% of the time and Democratic ones only 11.1%.10 As
Pierce summed up, “I can teach the doctrines . . . only as a vocabulary
lesson. The doctrinal elements of standing are nearly worthless as a basis
for predicting whether a judge will grant individuals with differing
interests access to the courts.”11
II.

JUDGE FLETCHER’S RECORD ON REVIEW

To proceed, then, with findings, both some that relate to Pierce’s
claims and others that do not: First, as best I could find, no court opinion
that Judge Fletcher has written on justiciability has been reversed by
either the en banc Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court, nor has a case in
which she dissented on a justiciability issue been upheld on further
review (which, of course, often did not take place). The Supreme Court
has reversed her, of course, including in cases in which she wrote on
justiciability issues—but in those cases, it did so on the merits. A
prominent recent example is Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Winter,12 in which the Ninth Circuit found no mootness bar to
environmental organizations’ challenge to the Navy’s use of sonar in
ways that might injure marine mammals13 and went on to impose
conditions on the sonar use.14 The Supreme Court reversed those
conditions that the Navy challenged, but the majority’s opinion dealt
with the merits and did not mention mootness issues.15

9. Id. at 1755.
10. Id. at 1759–60.
11. Id. at 1743.
12. 518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir.) (B. Fletcher, J.), rev’d on other grounds, 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 365
(2008).
13. Id. at 678–79.
14. Id. at 687–703.
15. See Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
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I have found only one case in which Judge Fletcher joined a
prevailing opinion on a justiciability matter that the Supreme Court
effectively reversed, and that case presents an interesting twist because
the panel denied standing and the Supreme Court vacated in light of a
contrary decision in another case. She and Judge Ferdinand Fernandez16
joined Judge Warren Ferguson’s opinion in Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc.,17
finding no standing in an employer’s challenge to a former female
employee’s use at trial of peremptory strikes against men to produce an
all-female jury.18 Some months later the Supreme Court decided
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,19 upholding a civil litigant’s thirdparty standing to raise excluded jurors’ claims of race-based peremptory
challenges,20 and then vacated and remanded Dias for further
consideration in light of Edmonson.21 For someone who has spent thirty
years serving in an often-reversed circuit, this single vacation in a
justiciability case seems not a bad record.
III. THE IDEOLOGICAL-DIVISION PATTERN IS MIXED
More significant for present purposes than whether Judge Fletcher has
a good batting average would be whether any sort of ideological pattern,
of the sort Professor Pierce reported, can be found in her justiciability
cases. Two major caveats are in order here. First, one sometimes
encounters—especially among students—suspicions of hidden agendas
in justiciability votes, with judges reaching to find justiciability when
they are sympathetic to a claim on its merits and voting against
justiciability when they want to avoid decision, or are unsympathetic, on
the merits. Such motive-imputing deserves skepticism because it
involves rank speculation (and it seems especially questionable at the
Supreme Court level because the Court can avoid decision by denying
16. Judges referred to by name only are Ninth Circuit judges.
17. 919 F.2d 1370, 1380 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and remanded, 501 U.S. 1201 (1991). The
unanimous panel can be presumed to be somewhat ideologically diverse, with Judges Ferguson and
Fletcher being Carter appointees and Judge Fernandez having been appointed by President George
H.W. Bush. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, The Judges of this Court in Order
of Seniority, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view_seniority_list.php?pk_id=0000000035
(last visited Dec. 20, 2009); Federal Judicial Center, Ferguson, Warren John,
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last visited Dec. 20, 2009). Information on judges sitting
on Ninth Circuit panels by designation comes from Googling them, from other courts’ websites, or
from Westlaw’s Almanac of the Federal Judiciary (AFJ) database.
18. Dias, 919 F.3d at 1377–80.
19. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
20. Id. at 629–30.
21. Sky Chefs, Inc. v. Dias, 501 U.S. 1201 (1991) (mem.).
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certiorari). The second caveat is that this essay does not attempt the sort
of comparative and statistical analysis that Professor Pierce offered; it
focuses on one judge without trying to compare the work of others. So
what I can offer are several prominent examples, which seem to present
a mixed picture that defies easy generalization, that relate to patterns one
might look for in justiciability decisions.
One question would be whether the cases show any tendency toward
ideological division. The answer is multifaceted. Of course, some cases
involved what could be viewed as ideological splits. Judge Fletcher
recently joined fellow Carter appointee Judge Stephen Reinhardt’s
opinion in D’Lil v. Best Western Encino Lodge & Suites,22 upholding the
standing of a disabled person who had filed many previous claims under
the Americans with Disabilities Act23 to pursue a particular claim. In this
case, the majority found that the plaintiff had shown enough of a
likelihood that she would use the specific facility again.24 Judge Pamela
Rymer, appointed by the first President Bush, dissented, faulting the
majority for giving too little deference to the district judge’s findings
and too little weight to the plaintiff’s pattern of suing other businesses
whose facilities she did not go back and use.25 Similarly, in Hemp
Industry Association v. Drug Enforcement Administration,26 Judge
Fletcher wrote for the majority, with fellow Carter appointee Chief
Judge Mary Schroeder joining her opinion, and Reagan appointee Judge
Alex Kozinski dissenting. The majority upheld the standing of hemp
producers to challenge a Drug Enforcement Agency rule that might
subject them to enforcement because their products could include traces
of the active ingredient in marijuana.27 The majority found the
possibility of enforcement great enough for the case not to be moot,28
and then went on to find the rule procedurally invalid.29 Judge Kozinski
dissented on mootness, pointing to a new agency regulation that, if
upheld, would negate the effect of the rule.30
Although such ideological splits do arise (these were the only two I
found), it is important to note that nearly all of the rulings I examined
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

538 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2824 (2009).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006).
D’Lil, 518 F.3d at 1037–40.
Id. at 1041–43 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
333 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1085 n.3 (mootness), 1086–87 (standing).
Id.
Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1092 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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are unanimous for or against justiciability, whether the panel has
members appointed by Presidents of different parties or all by
Democratic Presidents. Further, there are instances of patterns that do
not seem to cut along ideological lines: splits on panels with all
Democratic appointees, and even one decision in which Judge Fletcher
filed a result-only, no-standing concurrence from what may best be
characterized as the conservative side in a civil-rights case.
West v. Secretary of Transportation31 finds Judge Fletcher writing for
the panel majority, joined by fellow Carter appointee Judge Reinhardt,
with Clinton appointee Judge Sidney Thomas dissenting from their nomootness holding. For the majority, completion of the first stage of a
highway interchange did not moot a challenge that claimed the Federal
Highway Administration improperly exempted the stage from review
under the National Environmental Policy Act32 and sought a preliminary
injunction against construction.33 Judge Fletcher’s opinion viewed some
forms of relief, such as use restrictions, structural changes, and even
removal or closure of the interchange, as conceivable and reason enough
to save the challenge from being moot.34 Judge Thomas’s dissent
focused on the relief sought—a preliminary injunction against
construction in order to prevent environmental damage—and argued that
it was mooted by the construction and use of the interchange.35
The decision in which Judge Fletcher seemed to be concurring from
the right in a civil-rights case is Nava v. City of Dublin,36 a son’s suit for
his father’s death from a police carotid hold.37 Carter appointee Judge
Otto Skopil followed Ninth Circuit precedent, with apparent reluctance,
to find that the son had standing to seek a permanent injunction
restricting use of the hold, and was joined by District Judge John
Rhoades of Arizona, a Reagan appointee sitting by designation.38 The
majority went on to reverse the issuance of the injunction on the
merits.39 Judge Fletcher specially concurred in the result only, writing
that she could not reconcile the Ninth Circuit’s precedents with the

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

206 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2000).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006).
West, 206 F.3d at 924–26.
Id.
Id. at 931–32 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
121 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 454.
Id. at 455–58.
Id. at 458.
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Supreme Court’s notorious decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,40
which denied standing to a chokehold survivor to seek injunctive relief
against the practice because of the unlikelihood of his being subjected to
it again.41 She thus agreed that the injunction should be vacated,
although for lack of standing rather than on the merits, and called
unsuccessfully for en banc review of the post-Lyons precedents the
majority had followed.42 The signs of ideological division left by these
significant example cases seem decidedly mixed.
IV. JUDGE FLETCHER’S RECORD ON REACHING
“CONGENIAL” SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS IS ALSO MIXED
Aside from the possibility of an ideological split, another metric one
could infer from Pierce’s arguments is whether judges tend to find
justiciability when they might be expected to be sympathetic to a claim
on its merits, and the converse.43 Judge Fletcher, described in a recent
newspaper article as “the Ninth Circuit’s Lion of Liberalism,”44 might, if
that label is at least somewhat accurate, be predicted to find justiciability
for and uphold civil-rights and environmental claims, for example, and
avoid claims such as challenges to affirmative-action programs. If there
is any regularity in her decisions and votes in this respect, I have not
found it. For every significant example of such tendencies—and there
are some—other decisions do not seem to support the hypothesis.
In two affirmative-action cases the challengers lost both times—once
on standing, and once on the merits. In Scott v. Pasadena Unified School
District,45 she wrote for a unanimous panel of all-Democratic appointees
in finding no standing or ripeness in a challenge by parents to the
district’s lottery plan for admission to voluntary “magnet” schools.46 The
plaintiffs pointed to a racial factor in the plan as the basis for their equalprotection claim, but the court found the factor insufficient to find
justiciability because it had not been invoked in the actual case and
might not be used in the future.47 But in Associated General Contractors
40. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
41. Id. at 105–06.
42. Nava, 121 F.3d at 460 (B. Fletcher, J., specially concurring).
43. Actually, such an articulation seems too crude: a judge so operating, whether consciously or
subconsciously, might also be expected to lean toward finding justiciability if he were sympathetic
to a defense that he would like to see recognized as valid.
44. SEATTLE WEEKLY, Aug. 19–25, 2009, front cover.
45. 306 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2002).
46. Id. at 648–49, 663–64.
47. Id. at 653–61.
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of California, Inc. v. Coalition for Economic Equity,48 she wrote the
majority opinion finding associational standing in a challenge to a
municipal minority-business-enterprise ordinance,49 and upholding the
denial of a preliminary injunction for lack of a showing of likely success
on the merits.50 Reagan appointee Judge David Thompson joined her
opinion, and Reagan appointee Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain concurred
specially on the merits without addressing the standing issue.51
If “conservative” affirmative-action challengers lost in these two
examples, Judge Fletcher has not been a consistent vote for often
“liberal” environmentalists in cases involving standing issues. In one
significant case, she joined an opinion by Clinton appointee Judge
Ronald Gould finding no standing for an environmental group in a
challenge to Environmental Protection Agency action on water
projects.52 By contrast, in a case involving a claim that EPA action was
too rigorous rather than too lax, she joined Nixon appointee Judge
Alfred Goodwin’s opinion upholding standing for a water-conservation
district and irrigation districts on their claims against an emission
restriction;53 the unanimous panel then upheld the restriction on the
merits.54
I could give many more examples of the diverse pattern, or lack
thereof, that I see, but will limit myself to just a few. Wasson v. Sonoma
County Junior College55 involved a teacher’s challenge to her threatened
discharge, based on anonymous speech she denied authoring but was
found to have written.56 The majority opinion, written by Carter
appointee Judge Mary Schroeder and joined by Reagan appointee Judge
Cynthia Holcomb Hall, viewed the case as involving third-party standing
and held that the plaintiff lacked standing to defend the First
Amendment rights of the anonymous author.57 Judge Fletcher dissented,
characterizing the right claimed as the teacher’s “right not to be
48. 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991).
49. Id. at 1405–09.
50. Id. at 1418.
51. Id. at 1418–19 (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring).
52. Rattlesnake Coalition v. EPA, 509 F.3d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 2007). The third member of the
unanimous panel was George H.W. Bush appointee Judge Andrew Kleinfeld.
53. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. v. EPA, 990 F.2d 1531, 1533 (9th Cir. 1991). The third
panel member was Third Circuit Judge Ruggero Aldisert, a Johnson appointee sitting by
designation.
54. Id.
55. 203 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2000).
56. Id. at 661.
57. Id. at 663.
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retaliated against for speech she either made anonymously or did not
make at all” and regarding that as sufficient to support standing.58 She
went on to express views favorable to the plaintiff’s claim, based on
Supreme Court anonymous-speech precedents.59 Here, then, is a case
involving a favorable view on standing coupled with apparent sympathy
with the claim on the merits. Similarly, her opinion for an ideologically
diverse and (rare) unanimous en banc court in American Jewish
Congress v. City of Beverly Hills60 upheld both standing61 and an
Establishment Clause challenge to a menorah erected by a private group
in a city park.62
But there are also cases involving claims by liberals in which Judge
Fletcher found no standing. A leading example is Dellums v. United
States,63 in which she wrote for a unanimous panel of Democratic
appointees.64 The district court had found standing and ruled on the
merits for citizens seeking to compel the Attorney General to investigate
whether President Reagan and other federal officials had violated the
Neutrality Act65 by their actions with respect to the Sandinista
government in Nicaragua.66 Judge Fletcher’s opinion reversed on
standing grounds.67 Another case, Pacific Legal Foundation v. State
Energy Resources & Conservation & Development Corp.,68 presents, for
those who might be inclined to find pure politics in standing rulings, a
backwards picture. Judge Fletcher69 found standing for utility companies
but not for an employee who claimed to have lost his job as a result of a
challenged state regulation imposing a moratorium on the building of
new nuclear-power plants.70 She went on to find no preemption of the

58. Id. at 664 (B. Fletcher, J., dissenting).
59. Id.
60. 90 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
61. Id. at 381–82.
62. Id. at 386.
63. 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986).
64. Joining her opinion were Judge William Canby, a Carter appointee, and Seventh Circuit
Judge Thomas Fairchild, a Johnson appointee sitting by designation.
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 960 (2006).
66. Dellums, 797 F.2d at 819.
67. Id. at 821–23.
68. 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), aff’d, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
69. Ford appointee District Judge James Fitzgerald of Alaska, sitting by designation, joined Judge
Fletcher’s opinion. Carter appointee Judge Warren Ferguson agreed with the majority on its
standing rulings, id. at 928, while concurring separately on the merits, id. at 928–31.
70. Id. at 914–15.
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state regulation by federal law.71 The finding of standing for the direct
target of regulation, but not for those more incidentally and indirectly
affected by the regulation, is consistent with what the Supreme Court has
since said about standing.72
Further on the subject of reaching or not reaching the merits, two
political-question decisions provide a nice final contrast. A finding of
political-question nonjusticiability, in contrast to many no-standing
rulings, means that no one can bring a challenge to a disputed
government action; the subject is off limits for the courts. Standing
denials, by contrast, often leave it possible for some other challenger to
bring suit against the government position in question: the issue is not
whether there can be any challenger, but who that challenger may be.73
Probably Judge Fletcher’s most significant political-question opinion is
the one she wrote for a unanimous, ideologically diverse panel when
sitting by designation in the Eleventh Circuit. Made in the USA
Foundation v. United States74 involved a challenge by unions and a
nonprofit group to the constitutionality of the mode of enactment of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),75 which had not gone
through the treaty-ratification process with its requirement of a twothirds vote in the Senate but had been adopted instead by majority vote
in both Houses of Congress.76 The district court found standing and no
political-question barrier and upheld NAFTA’s adoption on the merits.77
Judge Fletcher’s opinion agreed that the plaintiffs had standing78 but
found several reasons for political-question nonjusticiability: a strong
71. Id. at 919–28.
72. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992) (Scalia, J.):
When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the nature and
extent of facts that must be averred . . . in order to establish standing depends considerably
upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he
is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a
judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it. When, however, . . . a plaintiff’s
asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of
regulation) of someone else, much more is needed.
Id.
73. Some rulings against standing, however, do have the effect of eliminating all possible
challengers and leaving the matter to the political process. “The assumption that if respondents have
no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.” Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974).
74. 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001). The other panel members were Ford appointee Judge Gerald
Tjoflat and Clinton appointee Judge Charles Wilson.
75. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 8, 1993, 107 Stat. 2057.
76. Made in the USA Found., 242 F.3d at 1303 & n.4.
77. Id. at 1302.
78. Id.
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textual commitment to the political branches of the conduct of foreign
affairs, judicial unsuitability for making the kind of political judgments
that would be involved, and strong prudential reasons for judicial noninvolvement.79 One can imagine the judges’ relief at not having to
decide whether NAFTA had been constitutionally adopted, but the case
does seem like a strong one for application of the political-question
doctrine.
Judge Fletcher’s other significant political-question decision went the
other way on a challenge to revenue legislation under the Constitution’s
clause requiring that bills to raise revenue must originate in the House of
Representatives.80 In Armstrong v. United States,81 she wrote for herself
and fellow Carter appointee Judge Stephen Reinhardt82 that a taxpayer
seeking a refund of an excise tax imposed by the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 198283 was not barred on political-question
grounds from doing so,84 but that the Senate’s complete replacement of
all but the enacting clause of the House bill did not violate the
origination clause.85 Five years later the Supreme Court, in a decision
unanimous as to outcome, upheld her position on the justiciability of
origination-clause claims.86
CONCLUSION
The very mixed picture on justiciability decisions that emerges from
this survey cannot by itself be taken as disproving Professor Pierce’s
findings about relative political predictability of judges’ leanings on
such issues.87 Again, it would take comparative work of the sort not
done here to test his findings in a different group of cases. But to the
extent that someone might be tempted to make fairly crude political
predictions about Judge Fletcher’s likely positions in justiciability cases,
one would be justified in asking, “How many counterexamples do you
want?”
79. Id. at 1311–20.
80. “All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives . . . .” U.S.
CONST. art. I. § 7, cl.1.
81. 759 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1985).
82. The third judge died after argument. Id. at 1379.
83. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
84. Armstrong, 759 F.2d at 1380.
85. Id. at 1380–82.
86. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387 (1990).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 5–11.
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***
I have saved for last a development with special Fletcher family
overtones. Earlier this essay described Nava v. City of Dublin, in which
Judge Fletcher concurred specially on the ground that she could not
reconcile a Supreme Court case limiting standing with Ninth Circuit
precedent that had interpreted that case as allowing standing in limited
circumstances.88 Her call for en banc consideration went unheeded at the
time, but within three years the court took an en banc case raising the
same issue.89 In the meantime, Judge Fletcher had assumed senior status
(although she remains fully active over ten years later); and her son
Willy Fletcher, nominated by President Clinton, had taken a seat on the
court in late 1998. Not only did the court vindicate her position and
overrule Nava and its predecessors,90 but it did so in a virtually
unanimous opinion91 for an ideologically diverse eleven-judge panel—
with a reference to her Nava concurrence92 and with Judge Willy
Fletcher, author of the lead article in this symposium,93 writing his
maiden en banc opinion for the court.94

88. 121 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 1997). See supra text accompanying notes 36–42.
89. Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
90. Id. at 1040 n.1.
91. See id. at 1045 (Reinhardt, J., specially concurring) (“I . . . concur in the court’s opinion. I
write separately, however, in order to disassociate myself from some of the opinion’s dicta . . . .”).
92. Id. at 1040 n.1.
93. William A. Fletcher, Tribute to Judge Betty Binns Fletcher, 85 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2010).
94. See Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1038.

